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COMMENT
COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT AS A





Currently, the Endangered Species Act is falling short of its potential. Even
though the Endangered Species Act has provided protection for endangered
and threatened species and helped some species to recover and even thrive, the
fact that most listed species’ habitat is on private land remains a hurdle that
has not yet been overcome. In fact, the stringent requirements imposed upon
private landowners often put endangered and threatened species at risk as
some private landowners will use any means possible to stop the government
from finding endangered or threatened species on their land. Because of this,
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service should consider implementing a
policy of collaborative management to ensure that protected species receive
the protection they need to recover and thrive. To do this, the agency should
consider applications by private landowners to participate in the collaborative
process on a case-by-case basis and work with a strong, preferably neutral,
entity to ensure that no individual stakeholder—whether government, com-
pany, or individual—takes advantage of the collaborative process. These poli-
cies can be best implemented through the Endangered Species Act’s
experimental populations clause before moving the collaborative-management
policy towards broader implementation across other areas of the Endangered
Species Act. Right now, the question is no longer if agencies can implement
collaborative strategies, but how these agencies can begin the process of re-
forming their regulations to include collaboration. Therefore, this Article of-
fers recommendations on how the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service can
implement collaborative management to best protect both endangered and
threatened species and provide incentives to private landowners to participate
in the process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has not always protected its wide variety of na-
tive species. In fact, even when Congress established the first national
park—Yellowstone National Park—the enabling legislation directed
the Secretary of the Interior to “provide against the wanton destruc-
tion of the fish and game found within [the] Park,” effectively creating
a policy of protecting livestock and desirable wildlife species, such as
elk, at the cost of predatory species, such as the gray wolf or the griz-
zly bear.1 As a result, the grizzly bear and the gray wolf in the Greater
Yellowstone Area, including within the National Park, were hunted to
virtual extinction within the next 100 years.2
However, United States policy changed in the 1960s and 1970s as
people recognized the importance of protecting the environment.
During this time period, the United States, recognizing the impor-
tance of environmental reform, began a process of enacting laws re-
garding the environment, which led “to the passage of many laws
designed to correct the mistakes of the past and help prevent similar
mistakes in the future.”3 One of these laws was the Endangered Spe-
cies Act (“ESA”), a law that not only required the protection of en-
dangered species, but, if possible, required the restoration of
endangered species that were eliminated from their natural habitat.4
The gray wolf is an outstanding example of an ESA success story. In
1978, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) listed the
gray wolf as an endangered species, beginning the process of restoring
the gray wolf population to its natural habitat.5 Twenty-one years
later, from 1995–1996, thirty-one gray wolves were introduced back
into Yellowstone National Park as an “experimental population,”6 and
the results have been striking. The gray wolf population in the Greater
Yellowstone Area has increased exponentially, and preliminary data
shows that the reintroduction of the wolves to the Yellowstone ecosys-
1. Wolf Restoration, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/yell/learn/nature/
wolf-restoration.htm (last updated Dec. 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/YT32-J2EF].
2. Id.; Grizzly Bears, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/yell/learn/nature/
grizzlybear.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2018) [https://perma.cc/D46G-AKLP].
3. Wolf Restoration, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Gray Wolf (Canis Lupus), U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://ecos.fws.gov/
ecp0/profile/speciesProfile?spcode=A00D (last visited Sept. 4, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
Y37U-GAM8].
6. Wolf Restoration, supra note 1.
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tem will contribute to greater biodiversity throughout the entire
Greater Yellowstone Area.7 Additionally, gray wolf populations
across the Northern Rockies have continued to be “robust, stable, and
self-sustaining exceeding recovery goals in Idaho, Montana, and Wyo-
ming since 2002” and making the wolf restoration a resounding
success.8
However, not everyone has celebrated the gray wolf’s recovery in
the United States. Ranch owners in many states such as Colorado,
Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming have been particularly frustrated with
the presence of so many predators threatening their livestock, busi-
nesses, and safety as species such as the gray wolf and the grizzly bear
have experienced population booms, particularly in the Northwest.9
And their fears are well-founded. For example, the FWS predicted
that ranchers stand to lose as much as $1,800–$30,500 annually due to
wolves preying on livestock in only the Yellowstone area,10 a finan-
cial-loss range that would be devastating for small ranch owners who
live on the financial edge.
Furthermore, the requirements of the ESA are stringent and often
result in a “piecemeal application of the ESA with no overarching
plan for how best to preserve endangered or threatened species.”11
The stringent requirements combined with the lack of an overarching
plan for recovery ultimately leaves private landowners feeling as if
they have no control over their own land. For example, when asked
about the reintroduction of the wolves to the Greater Yellowstone
Area, one rancher stated that he felt that the gray wolf reintroduction
decision was “shoved ‘down [his] throat with a plunger.’”12
Therefore, two opposing views exist regarding ESA regulation. Sup-
porters of the ESA often point to the importance of species, arguing
that the survival of species is of utmost importance because one can
never know the effect that the eradication of a species will have on the
7. Id.
8. Gray Wolves in the Northern Rocky Mountains, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/es/grayWolf.php/ [https://perma.cc/A77E-
VSVV] (last modified Aug. 1, 2018).
9. See Leslie Kaufman, After Years of Conflict, a New Dynamic in Wolf Country,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/05/science/earth/conflict-
over-wolves-yields-new-dynamic-between-ranchers-and-conservationists.html?mcubz
=0 [https://perma.cc/4A97-L8F5].
10. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT:
THE REINTRODUCTION OF GRAY WOLVES TO YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK AND
CENTRAL IDAHO 19 (1994), https://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/es/species/mam
mals/wolf/EIS_1994.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZS8-6WW7].
11. Eric Fisher, Comment, Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered
Species Act: No Surprises & the Quest for Certainty, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 371, 372
(1996).
12. Kaufman, supra note 9.
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rest of the ecosystem.13 These supporters are thankful for this type of
rigid legislation and take pride in “their government for upholding
such high standards when it comes to preserving rare species of plants
and animals.”14 ESA advocates emphasize that the ESA would not be
effective if it were not absolutist because, without such strong provi-
sions in the statute, the ESA would likely fail to ensure the recovery
of an endangered or threatened species at all.15 In their view, the ESA
is effective because it takes an “absolutist stance” regarding threats to
endangered species, without which the ESA loses all purpose.16
Alternatively, critics of the ESA argue that the statute actually pun-
ishes private landowners whose private property is the last remaining
habitat for endangered and threatened species by “imposing signifi-
cant regulatory burdens on them.”17 These critics argue that Congress
probably would not have passed the ESA had its intrusive effect on
private rights been apparent. These critics point out that Congress cre-
ated a statute that devolved into a “bureaucratic mess that no longer
benefits humans, but instead overburdens private landowners and de-
velopment and values species’ needs above human needs.”18 In their
view, a statute that was designed to protect species such as gray
wolves, bears, and whooping cranes has instead become a “powerful
and far-reaching land-use control” provision, something that Congress
could not have intended.19
Ultimately, both sides make legitimate points. The protection of
species is important, and the government should ensure that species
are protected from human activity. But the ESA also disproportion-
ately affects private landowners. According to the FWS, approxi-
mately “half of listed species have at least 80 percent of their habitat
on private lands.”20 Therefore, the dichotomy of how to allow private
13. See Wolf Reintroduction Changes Ecosystem, MY YELLOWSTONE PARK (June
21, 2011), https://www.yellowstonepark.com/things-to-do/wolf-reintroduction-changes
-ecosystem [https://perma.cc/LRL4-4PVS].
14. Roddy Scheer & Doug Moss, Is the Endangered Species Act a Success or Fail-
ure?, SCI. AM., https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/endangered-species-act-
success-failure/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/7BHE-Q4FE].
15. See Ari N. Sommer, Note, Taking the Pit Bull Off the Leash: Siccing the En-
dangered Species Act on Climate Change, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 273, 284
(2009).
16. Id.
17. Endangered Species Depend on Private Land for Habitat, So Why Treat Land-
owners as the Enemy?, FREECOLOGY (July 31, 2017), https://libertarianenvironmen
talism.com/2017/07/31/inhabitable-habitat/ [https://perma.cc/HX9W-FD8U].
18. Caitlin Troyer Busch, Ethical Convergence and the Endangered Species Act,
GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. (Apr. 25, 2016), https://gelr.org/2016/04/25/ethical-convergence-
and-the-endangered-species-act/ [https://perma.cc/99R8-TXL9].
19. Brian Seasholes, Bad for Species, Bad for People: What’s Wrong with the En-
dangered Species Act and How to Fix It, NAT’L CTR. FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS (Sept. 1,
2007), http://www.ncpathinktank.org/pub/st303 [https://perma.cc/6QT4-KGNC].
20. Our Endangered Species Program and How It Works with Landowners, U.S.
FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (July 2009), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/
landowners.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2XR-ZFXE].
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landowners to use their land while ensuring that endangered or
threatened species can recover occurs in most situations in which ESA
regulations are triggered.
The resulting tension is not only detrimental to private landowners
whose use of their own land is reduced, but it is also detrimental to the
recovery of a species. For example, some landowners will take steps to
actually rid their land of the endangered or threatened species before
the FWS discovers the endangered species on their land. These steps
to eliminate the endangered species from their property include di-
rectly killing the species—known colloquially as “shoot, shove[,] and
shut-up”—or indirectly destroying the species’s habitat through a
“scorched earth” policy that “makes actual or potential habitat unsuit-
able through such activities as plowing, prematurely cutting trees or
clearing brush.”21
Therefore, to more adequately protect species and preserve the
rights of private individuals, agency cooperation with private land-
owners is essential. As J.B. Ruhl stated, “the fact that the ESA is mor-
ally good does not mean we cannot make it morally better, and we can
do so by focusing on its inherent unfairness to landowners.”22 One
way that the ESA can become morally better is for its regulations to
be enforced through a collaborative-management model that is inclu-
sive of all stakeholders instead of the conventional top-down legisla-
tive model. A collaborative-management model would allow private
landowners to provide input on how to best allow landowners to use
their own land while allowing an endangered or threatened species to
also thrive on their land. In this way, the collaborative-management
21. Seasholes, supra note 19. Ultimately, this “scorched earth” policy not only rids
the land of the endangered or threatened species but can threaten the more common
species that rely on the same habitat. Brain Seasholes, The Importance of Property
Rights for Successful Endangered Species Conservation, REASON FOUND. 3 (July 9,
2015), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Seasholes-07092015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YAM4-SF2C]. An example of this type of reaction in attempting to
avoid ESA regulation can be found in how landowners reacted to the listing of the
red-cockaded woodpecker. When the red-cockaded woodpecker was listed, its recov-
ery plan “required private landowners to protect between 60 and 300 acres per col-
ony” of woodpeckers. Estimates showed that forgoing timber harvests for a single
red-cockaded woodpecker colony would cause private landowners to lose anywhere
from $30,000 to $200,000. Upon realizing the economic effect of having red-cockaded
woodpeckers on their land, landowners proceeded to cut timber to eliminate suitable
habitat before the birds migrated onto their land. Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael,
Preemptive Habitat Destruction Under the Endangered Species Act, 46 J.L. & ECON.
27, 30, 33 (2003). In this way, landowners were able to “protect or enhance to existing
value of their property” to the detriment of the red-cockaded woodpecker. Addition-
ally, private landowners were actually incentivized “to urge their neighbors to do the
same, because the [red-cockaded woodpecker] on neighboring land increase[d] the
vulnerability of them and other neighbors as well.” Daowei Zhang, Endangered Spe-
cies and Timber Harvesting: The Case of Red-Cockaded Woodpeckers, 42 ECON. IN-
QUIRY 150, 162 (2004).
22. J.B. Ruhl, Endangered Species Act and Private Property: A Matter of Timing
and Location, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 43 (1998).
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model has the capacity to create a more sustainable approach to wild-
life conservation.
In fact, the implementation of collaborative policies and regulations
is not as radical a thought as it might have been a decade ago. Cur-
rently, the FWS has programs such as Safe Harbor Agreements,
Habitat Conservation Plans, Conservation Banks, and Section 6
grants that allow some input and flexibility for private landowners
who have endangered or threatened species on their land.23 Addition-
ally, programs such as the Candidate Conservation Program allow pri-
vate landowners to create plans with the FWS to conserve species who
are candidates for the listing process so that, in theory, the private
landowner never has to fall under ESA regulations.24 But, despite
these programs, more can be done, and the ESA could provide the
opportunity for various stakeholders to come together and create a
system that works to protect species and has the buy-in from private
landowners that is necessary for adequately protecting endangered
and threatened species and helping them thrive.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I discusses the ESA,
specifically its purpose, Section 4, Section 9, and Section 10. Part II
provides an overview of the interaction between the ESA and private
landowners. Part III provides an overview of collaborative manage-
ment, focusing on collaborative management as a better alternative
than litigation and how parties can practically apply it in various sce-
narios. Finally, Part IV discusses the ways in which collaborative man-
agement can be used to enforce the ESA, particularly what programs
it can be used with and how it can improve the imposition of stringent
ESA regulations on private landowners.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
In 1973, Congress learned three things: (1) the United States was
losing approximately one species per year; (2) the pace of this loss
appeared to be accelerating; and (3) this loss was not related to the
process of natural selection.25 In light of this dire prognosis, a “wide
range of stakeholders with differing environmental values came to-
gether to craft a far-reaching and unprecedented environmental
law”—the ESA.26
A. Purpose
As the “most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of en-
dangered species ever enacted by any nation,” the ESA’s purpose is to
23. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., WORKING TOGETHER: TOOLS FOR HELPING IM-
PERILED WILDLIFE ON PRIVATE LANDS 5 (2005), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/
esa-library/pdf/ImperiledWildlifeFinalDec2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQN2-57T8].
24. Id. at 14.
25. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 176 (1978).
26. Busch, supra note 18.
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protect species with little consideration of cost or consequences.27 In
fact, when Congress discussed the proposed ESA, “the dominant
theme pervading all Congressional discussion . . . was the overriding
need to devote whatever effort and resources were necessary to avoid
further diminution of national and worldwide wildlife resources.”28
Case law supports upholding the ESA in its current, absolutist form
despite critics who argue that it is too intrusive upon a private individ-
ual’s rights. In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the Supreme Court
explained why the absolutist form is important, reasoning that “the
ESA was not meant to be a hollow law collecting dust with scant en-
forcement. Despite subsequent controversy over this decision and nu-
merous amendments to the ESA, the fundamental tenants for species
and habitat protection remain intact”—endangered and threatened
species must be protected despite the cost.29
B. Section 4
Section 4 of the ESA gives the FWS and the National Marine Fish-
eries Service (“NMFS”) the power to list endangered and threatened
species.30 An “endangered species” is one that is “in danger of extinc-
tion throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”31 Alterna-
tively, a “threatened species” refers to a “species which is likely to
become an endangered species within the foreseeable future through-
out all or a significant portion of its range.”32 According to statute,
endangered species receive all of the protections under the ESA,
whereas threatened species receive protections determined on a case-
by-case basis by the FWS or the NMFS.33 In practice, however, the
FWS provides threatened species with all of the same protections that
27. Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 189. However, the Trump Administration’s
rollback of some rules for endangered species may affect this analysis. The Trump
Administration’s rollback would allow the economic consequences of protecting can-
didate species to be considered during the listing process. Even though the decision
regarding whether to list a species would be based on the “best available science,” the
cost of protecting the proposed species would also be considered. Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 83 Fed. Reg. 143 (proposed July 25, 2018) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Nathan Rott, What the Trump Administration Has Pro-
posed to Change in the Endangered Species Act, NPR (July 26, 2018, 4:15 PM), https://
www.npr.org/2018/07/26/632771911/what-the-trump-administration-has-proposed-to-
change-in-the-endangered-species-a [https://perma.cc/U4JZ-5AFL].
28. Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 177.
29. Gabriel Eckstein & Jesse Snyder, Endangered Species in the Oil Patch: Chal-
lenges and Opportunities for the Oil and Gas Industry, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 379, 383
(2013).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2012).
31. Id. § 1532(6).
32. Id. § 1532(20).
33. See Listing a Species as a Threatened or Endangered Species: Section 4 of the
Endangered Species Act, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Aug. 2016), https://
www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/listing.pdf [https://perma.cc/X69W-G8LQ].
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endangered species receive. Therefore, at this time, there is little dif-
ference between the distinctions “threatened” or “endangered.”34
The listing process is a mandate35 that requires the listing agency to
decide whether to list a proposed species “solely on the basis of the
best scientific and commercial data available,” with no consideration
of cost or consequences.36 To determine whether to list a proposed
species as endangered or threatened, the FWS considers the following
factors: (1) “the present or threatened destruction, modification, or
curtailment of its habitat or range”; (2) “overutilization for commer-
cial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes”; (3) “disease or
predation”; (4) “the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms”;
or (5) “other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued exis-
tence.”37 In accordance with these factors, the FWS may find that the
(1) listing petition for the proposed species is not warranted;38 (2) list-
ing petition for the proposed species is warranted;39 or (3) listing peti-
tion for the proposed species “is warranted, but precluded by higher
listing activities.40
If the listing is warranted, the agency must propose a listing rule
which eventually leads to the official listing of the species as either
endangered or threatened.41 After listing the species, the FWS must
then designate the species’s critical habitat “to the maximum extent
prudent and determinable”42 and create a recovery plan “for the con-
servation and survival of endangered and threatened species.”43 If the
listing is not warranted, then agency consideration of the listing of the
proposed species comes to an end.
Alternatively, if a listing petition is found to be warranted, but pre-
cluded, the proposed species may be listed as a candidate species by
34. Id. But see Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants 83 Fed. Reg. 143
(proposed July 25, 2018) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Rott, supra note 27
(stating the policy of allowing threatened species to receive the same protections as
endangered species has been threatened by the Trump Administration’s proposed
rollback of ESA regulations; however, the FWS proposal would revert the FWS’s
practice back to determining protection for threatened species on a case-by-case basis
rather than allowing threatened species to automatically receive the same protections
as endangered species).
35. Maggie Kuhn, Note, Climate Change and the Polar Bear: Is the Endangered
Species Act Up to the Task?, 27 ALASKA L. REV. 125, 129 (2010).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b).
37. Id. § 1533(a)(1)–(2) (concerning the species over which the NMFS has juris-
diction, the NMFS decides that a species should be endangered or threatened and
subsequently informs the FWS, who ultimately lists the species in accordance with the
listing factors).
38. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(i) (stating what action must be taken when the petitioned
action is not warranted). In this case, the FWS must publish the “not warranted”
finding in the Federal Register.
39. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(ii).
40. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii); Eckstein & Snyder, supra note 29, at 385.
41. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(ii).
42. Id. § 1533(a)(2)(3)(A).
43. Id. § 1533(f)(1).
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the FWS or the NMFS.44 A candidate species under FWS jurisdiction
is a “species for which the [FWS] possesses sufficient information on
vulnerability and threats to support a proposal to list as endangered or
threatened, but for which no proposed rule has yet been published by
the [FWS].”45 A candidate species under NMFS jurisdiction is a spe-
cies that is “[t]he subject of a petition to list and for which the [NMFS]
has determined that listing may be warranted.”46 Designation as a
candidate species under either agency’s jurisdiction allows a species to
receive some protection before the species is officially classified as en-
dangered or threatened. Additionally, certain programs such as Can-
didate Conservation Agreements (“CCAs”) and Candidate
Conservation Agreements with Assurances47 (“CCAAs”) are availa-
ble to private landowners who have candidate species on their land for
the purpose of encouraging “cooperative conservation efforts for
these species because, they are, by definition, species that may war-
rant future protection under the ESA.”48
C. Section 9
Once the FWS lists a species as endangered or threatened, the spe-
cies receives protection under Sections 7 and 9 of the ESA.49
Section 7 prohibits federal agencies from taking any actions that
would jeopardize an endangered species by requiring the federal
agency to consult with the FWS.50 Federal agencies are required to
request “an advanced expert opinion [from the FWS] to determine
whether an action is likely to jeopardize a listed species or adversely
modify its critical habitat.”51 If the agency action is likely to do so,
then the agency must consult with the expert from the FWS to “iden-
tify reasonable and prudent alternatives that [would] avoid unfavora-
ble consequences” to the species.52 This requirement reflects a
“conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority
over the ‘primary missions’ of federal agencies.”53
44. Candidate Conservation: The Candidate Conservation Process, U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-we-do/candidate-conserva
tion-process.html (last updated Dec. 11, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9KSN-EMT8].
45. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(1) (2017).
46. Id. § 219.19(2).
47. Candidate Conservation Agreements, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., (Oct.
2017), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/CCAs.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7J34-R72N]; Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances (CCAA), U.S. FISH
& WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/permits/enhancement/
ccaa/index.html (last updated Oct. 4, 2016) [https://perma.cc/HZH6-RA69].
48. Candidate Species: Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act, U.S. FISH & WILD-
LIFE SERV. (Oct. 2017), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/candidate_
species.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZUJ-THCV].
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2012); Id. § 1538(a).
50. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
51. Eckstein & Snyder, supra note 29, at 387.
52. Id.
53. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978).
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Alternatively, Section 9 is much broader and is essentially designed
to operate as a catch-all to ensure complete protection of an endan-
gered or threatened species. Section 9 prohibits any person from “tak-
ing” an endangered species “within the United States or the territorial
sea of the United States.”54 For purposes of the ESA, a person is de-
fined as:
an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any
other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department, or
instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipal-
ity, or political subdivision of a State or of any foreign government;
any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State; or any
other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.55
Each of these entities are prohibited from “taking” an endangered
species,56 meaning that these entities cannot “harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect” an endangered or
threatened species.57 In fact, these entities are prohibited from even
attempting to “take” an endangered or threatened species.58
Furthermore, the FWS has promulgated a regulation that defines
“harm” as “an act which actually kills or injures fish or wildlife,” in-
cluding “significant habitat modification or degradation where [the ac-
tion] actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or shelter-
ing.”59 Because the concept of “significant habitat modification” is un-
clear, most of the litigation has focused on “how far to stretch” that
concept,60 with most courts finding and reaffirming the policy that any
action that affects an endangered or threatened species by impacting
its critical habitat amounts to a taking.
For example, in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural
Resources (“Palila I”), the Ninth Circuit considered whether the intro-
duction and maintenance of feral sheep and goats in the Palila bird’s
critical habitat “amounted to a taking.”61 The court held that the
maintaining of feral sheep and goats in the Palila’s bird’s critical
habitat violated the ESA because the Palila bird was endangered by
the activity.62 Additionally, the court emphasized that its decision was
“consistent with the Act’s legislative history showing that Congress
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B); id. § 1538(a)(1)(C)–(D) (prohibiting persons from
importing or exporting an endangered or threatened species, taking any endangered
or threatened species “upon the high seas,” or engaging in any commerce or transpor-
tation of such species).
55. Id. § 1532(13).
56. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
57. Id. § 1532(19).
58. Id.
59. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2017).
60. Kuhn, supra note 35, at 136.
61. Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Nat. Res., 639 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 1981).
62. Id. at 498.
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was informed that the greatest threat to endangered species is the de-
struction of their natural habitat.”63 Therefore, Palila I affirmed that
any action that affects an endangered or threatened species by im-
pacting its critical habitat amounts to a taking under the ESA.
A few years later, petitioners brought another action on behalf of
the Palila bird to add “mouflon sheep as destructive animals to be
removed from the Palila’s habitat.”64 In Palila v. Hawaii Department
of Natural Resources (“Palila II”), the Hawaii Department of Natural
Resources contended that “no taking exist[ed] because the evidence
show[ed] that (1) a huntable number of sheep . . . could co-exist with
the Palila; and (2) the Palila [were] doing poorly because of the re-
cently removed feral sheep and goats, not the mouflon sheep.”65 The
Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments, concluding that the district
court properly included “habitat destruction that could result in the
extinction of the Palila” bird within the definition of “harm.”66 There-
fore, Palila II again reaffirmed that harm includes any action which
affects a species’s critical habitat.
Finally, the Supreme Court, in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon, further affirmed the broad defini-
tion of harm by reversing the Fourth Circuit’s ruling that “take” must
be “read as applying only to the perpetrator’s direct application of
force against the animal taken.”67 In Babbitt, “small landowners, log-
ging companies, and families dependent on the forest products indus-
tries in the Pacific Northwest and in the Southeast” challenged the
“application of the ‘harm’ regulation” because they had suffered eco-
nomic losses due to the breadth of the harm regulation’s application.68
The Court reasoned that the appellate court’s ruling that “take” must
apply only when there is a “direct application of force” directly con-
flicted with the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Palila I and Palila II.69
Additionally, the Court reasoned that some of the words in the defini-
tion of “take” “do not require direct application of force” because
there is no intent requirement for a taking to occur.70 Therefore, harm
should be read as having its own independent meaning.71 Thus, the
Court affirmed the FWS’s broad discretion to make policy choices,
and, as a result, concluded that the FWS had “reasonably construed
the intent of Congress when they defined ‘harm’ to include ‘significant
63. Id. (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978)).
64. Palila, 852 F.2d at 1107.
65. Id. at 1109.
66. Id. at 1108.
67. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 687
(1995).
68. Id. at 692.
69. Id. at 694–95.
70. Id. at 701–02.
71. Id. at 702.
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habitat modification or degradation that actually kills or injures
wildlife.’”72
These cases—Palila I, Palila II, and Babbitt—have upheld the
FWS’s broad definition of “take” as including any action that impacts
a threatened or endangered species’s critical habitat. Furthermore,
“case law suggests that the government need only prove a general in-
tent when prosecuting ESA takings violations; knowledge that a par-
ticular species is protected is not dispositive.”73 The breadth of the
definition of “take” is slightly concerning, especially for small, private
landowners, because it has the capacity to cover a range of innocent
activity as well as intentional, harmful activity. The broad definition
becomes even more concerning when considered with the penalties
that one may face for violating Section 9. Penalties range from as high
as $25,000 per violation for civil penalties to “$50,000 with up to one
year in prison per violation” for criminal penalties.74 However, Sec-
tion 10 provides some mitigation for people to avoid violating the
broad takings clause, allowing, in some instances, a person to “take”
an endangered or threatened species for a specific purpose.
D. Section 10
Section 10 provides some exceptions to Section 9, specifically
through the incidental take permit which allows “an entity to inciden-
tally kill an endangered species or to modify its habitat in the course
of business activity.”75
An incidental take permit allows “persons” to “take” an endan-
gered species if that “taking is incidental to . . . the carrying out of an
otherwise lawful activity.”76 To receive an incidental take permit, the
applicant must submit a habitat conservation plan (“HCP”) that speci-
fies (1) “the impact which will likely result from such taking”; (2)
“what steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such im-
pacts, and the funding that will be available to implement such steps”;
(3) “what alternative actions to such taking the applicant considered
and the reasons why such alternatives are not being utilized”; and (4)
“other measures that the Secretary may require as being necessary or
appropriate for purposes of the plan.”77 The purpose of these HCPs is
“to minimize and mitigate harmful effects” of human activity on en-
dangered or threatened species.78
After public comment, the FWS must issue the incidental take per-
mit if the agency finds that (1) “the taking will be incidental”; (2) the
72. Id. at 708.
73. Eckstein & Snyder, supra note 29, at 382.
74. Id.
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2012); Babbit, 515 U.S. at 389.
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
77. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
78. Eckstein & Snyder, supra note 29, at 389.
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applicant will “minimize and mitigate the impacts” of the taking to the
“maximum extent practicable”; (3) “the applicant will ensure that ad-
equate funding for the plan will be provided”; (4) “the taking will not
appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the
species in the wild”; and (5) the measures required by the FWS as
“necessary or appropriate for the purposes of the plan” will be met.79
If the FWS does issue an incidental take permit, the permit holder is
then entitled to “no surprises.”80 Under the “No Surprises” policy, the
FWS promises that, if a “landowner invests money and land into sav-
ing endangered, threatened, or unlisted species covered in an HCP,
the government will not later require that the landowner pay more or
provide additional land even if the needs of species change over
time.”81 In this way, the No Surprises policy “strengthen[s] the effec-
tiveness of HCPs” and encourages “developers and private landown-
ers to participate in the creation of an HCP in return for the
government’s guarantee of exclusion from any future demands of fi-
nancial or land contributions.”82
III. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN ENDANGERED SPECIES AND
PRIVATE LANDOWNERS
According to the FWS, “[a]pproximately half of listed species have
at least 80 percent of their habitat on private lands.”83 Therefore, pri-
vate landowners are instrumental to the recovery of a protected spe-
cies. However, the overall population of endangered or threatened
species often struggles to recover if a majority of their habitat is on
private lands, as evidenced by the differences found in the recovery of
species on federal lands versus species on private lands. On federal
lands, about 18% of protected species appear to be improving, and
approximately 39% of these species have stable populations.84 In con-
trast, on exclusively private lands, only 3% of protected species seem
to be improving and “only sixteen percent are thought to be stable.”85
The Attwater’s prairie chicken is a perfect example of how a species
has struggled to recover on private land. The Attwater’s prairie
chicken is a grouse whose habitat is found along the coast of Louisi-
ana and Texas.86 One hundred years ago, approximately one million
79. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2).
80. Eckstein & Snyder, supra note 29, at 390.
81. Fisher, supra note 11, at 386.
82. Id. at 374.
83. Our Endangered Species Program and How It Works with Landowners, supra
note 20.
84. John F. Turner & Jason C. Rylander, Conserving Endangered Species on Pri-
vate Lands, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 571, 573 (1997).
85. Id.
86. Attwater’s Prairie Chicken, NAT’L FISH & WILDLIFE FOUND., http://
www.nfwf.org/attwater/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
RJM2-WL7Y].
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of these prairie chickens inhabited their range, but by the time the
Attwater’s prairie chicken was listed as endangered in 1967, only 1,000
of these birds remained.87 Today, the greatest threat to the Attwater’s
prairie chicken is habitat loss—there is less than 1% of what used to
be the Attwater’s prairie chicken’s original habitat remaining in “rela-
tively pristine condition,” primarily within areas such as the
Attwater’s Prairie Chicken National Wildlife Refuge.88 As a result of
this habitat loss, the species’s population has dwindled, not in-
creased.89 Therefore, as efforts are made to further increase the popu-
lation for the Attwater’s prairie chicken by expanding the available
habitat, there must be private landowner support for this species to
recover.
This is because many species have habitat ranges across wide swaths
of land—something they need for genetic sustainability.90 The
Attwater’s prairie chicken’s habitat is across two states—Texas and
Louisiana—and the gray wolf’s historic habitat ranged across almost
the entire northern, western, and southern areas of the United States.
Therefore, if protected species are only receiving protection in certain
areas, such as national parks or wildlife reserves, then these species
will take longer to recover because their habitat is fractured. These
species, once they leave protected areas, face threats such as city de-
velopment, ranches, hunters, and lack of resources, which will likely
make the recovery of the protected species much longer, if not
impossible.
This situation creates a difficult predicament for private landown-
ers. By the time a species comes under ESA protection, it is almost
too late to save the species.91 In fact, the species is probably on the
brink of extinction even before the listing process begins. As a result,
the efforts to save what few species remain “inevitably impact dispro-
portionately the lands where the species still exists,”92 lands which are
very likely private lands. More often than not, private landowners
have good intentions, but these private landowners also bear “too
87. Id.
88. Attwater’s Prairie-chicken Recovery Program: Questions and Answers, U.S.
FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://nctc.fws.gov/Pubs9/apcrecov.pdf (last visited Mar. 6,
2018) [https://perma.cc/H7EX-6XUH]. The Attwater’s Prairie Chicken National
Wildlife Refuge was created in 1972 and contains almost 10,000 acres of protected
habitat. The land for this wildlife reserve was donated by a private landowner who
found one of the last remaining wild populations of the Attwater’s Prairie Chicken on
her property. Attwater’s Prairie Chicken, TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE (2009), https://
tpwd.texas.gov/publications/pwdpubs/media/pwd_br_w7000_0018e.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZV6P-SFCX].
89. Turner & Rylander, supra note 84.
90. America’s Gray Wolves: A Long Road to Recovery, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/gray_wolves/index.html
(last visited Mar. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/HQH6-3HVM].
91. Turner & Rylander, supra note 84, at 572.
92. Id. at 573–74.
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much of the burden of protection simply because they happen to own
the majority of . . . endangered species habitats.”93 The ESA does pro-
vide some flexibility for private landowners through programs such as
Candidate Conservation Programs (“CCPs”), CCAs, and CCAAs, in-
cidental take permits, and the No Surprises policy. But these programs
often have little effect on listed species and still leave private land-
owners feeling as if they are punished for the sins of society rather
than something they did on their own.
The FWS provides flexibility for landowners in at least three ways.
The CCP is a voluntary program that can provide a way for landown-
ers to avoid falling under ESA regulations altogether by helping spe-
cies designated as candidate species avoid the listing process. The
agreements under this program allow a landowner, who is aware that
a candidate species is on her land, to help the species recover before it
is listed as endangered or threatened. Alternatively, the two other
programs—incidental take permits and the No Surprises policy—pro-
vide some flexibility and assurances to private landowners who al-
ready have endangered or threatened species on their land.
The FWS’s CCP offers conservation benefits to candidate species by
providing “technical and financial support to landowners who wish to
develop voluntary conservation strategies for candidate species in or-
der to address threats to the species while also avoiding the need to
list the species as threatened or endangered.”94 The FWS designates
candidate species in one of two ways—biological assessment of a de-
clining species with results finding that the species meets the defini-
tion of a candidate species or public petition to list a species and a
FWS finding that the species’s listing is warranted but precluded.95
Once a species is designated as a candidate species, it is moved into
the CCP, where it should receive further evaluations and assessments
to determine its recovery or whether it should be listed.96
Landowners may make two types of agreements with the FWS
through the CCP—a CCA or a CCAA.97 These agreements are based
on the FWS’s recognition that “[e]arly conservation efforts for declin-
ing species can be greatly expanded through collaborative approaches
that foster cooperation and exchange of ideas among multiple
parties.”98
According to the FWS, “CCAs are formal, voluntary agreements
between the [FWS] and one or more parties to address the conserva-
tion needs of one or more candidate species or species likely to be-
come candidates in the near future” based off of the FWS’s
93. Id. at 573.
94. Eckstein & Snyder, supra note 29, at 391.
95. Candidate Conservation: The Candidate Conservation Process, supra note 44.
96. Id.
97. Candidate Conservation Agreements, supra note 47.
98. Id.
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recognition that “[e]arly conservation efforts for declining species can
be greatly expanded through collaborative approaches that foster co-
operation and exchange of ideas among multiple parties.”99 Those
who participate in the program do so voluntarily and “commit to im-
plement specific actions designed to remove or reduce threats to the
covered species, so that listing may not be necessary.”100 CCAs are
primarily agreements between the FWS and federal agencies and
states, however, private property owners may still enter into a CCA
with the FWS.101 Under this agreement, “no Enhancement of Survival
Permit is issued,” meaning that “there is no permit that authorizes
incidental take of the covered species in the event listing occurs, and
no assurances are provided by the [FWS].”102
Alternatively, a CCAA is exclusively an agreement between the
FWS and non-federal property owners.103 This program was instituted
because of the FWS’s recognition that “[c]onservation of animal and
plant resources on non-federal lands is important because many spe-
cies rely heavily—or even entirely—on such lands,” but because of
“potential land use restrictions,” “some property owners have been
reluctant to engage in conservation activities that encourage use of
their land or water by such species.”104 Due to this concern, CCAAs
provide “incentives for non-federal property owners to engage in vol-
untary conservation activities that provide a net conservation benefit
to the species.”105 These incentives include assurances that, if the non-
federal land owner “engage[s] in certain conservation actions for spe-
cies included in the agreement, [the non-federal land owner] will not
be required to implement additional conservation measures beyond
those in the CCAA,” even if the species is eventually listed as
threatened or endangered.106 Therefore, unlike CCAs, CCAAs will is-
sue an Enhancement of Survival Permit with the CCAA which “pro-
vides assurances that, if the species is subsequently listed and no other
changes have occurred, the [FWS] will not require the permittee to
conduct any additional conservation measures without consent.”107
Furthermore, the Enhancement of Survival Permit “authorizes a spe-
cific level of incidental take of the covered species should listing
occur.”108
After a species is listed, the agreements under the CCP are no
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cidental take permit and take advantage of the FWS’s No Surprises
policy.109 Before 1982, landowners were struggling with inflexible
ESA regulations because the ESA prohibited any taking of a spe-
cies.110 As a result, Congress authorized the FWS to issue permits for
incidental takings of a protected species, thus allowing incidental take
permit holders to “proceed with an activity that is legal in all other
respects, but that results in the ‘incidental’ taking of a listed spe-
cies.”111 If any of their actions may affect a protected species, private
landowners may apply for an incidental take permit by submitting a
HCP that states the following:
(1) the impact which will likely result from the taking contemplated;
(2) the steps the applicant will take to minimize or mitigate the im-
pacts identified, as well as funding available for implementation of
these mitigation measures; (3) a discussion of alternates to the con-
templated action and an explanation why those alternatives are not
being utilized; [and] (4) such other measures required by the Secre-
tary as necessary or appropriate to fulfill the purpose of the HCP.112
Additionally, the “applicant’s HCP must list and explain all proposed
activities which may cause an incidental taking.”113 If the FWS accepts
the applicant’s HCP, the FWS issues an incidental take permit, which
allows the landowner to “take” an endangered species pursuant to the
incidental take permit so long as the harm to the species is incidental
to otherwise lawful activity.114
Additionally, the FWS follows a No Surprises policy to incentivize
private landowners and developers to create HCPs “in return for the
government’s guarantee of exclusion from any future demands of fi-
nancial or land contributions.”115 The purpose of the No Surprises
policy is that, “if, in the course of development or land use, a land-
owner invests money and land into saving endangered, threatened, or
unlisted species covered in an HCP, the government will not later re-
quire that the landowner pay more or provide additional land,” re-
gardless of whether the needs of the species change.”116 Therefore, if
109. Patrick Duggan, Incidental Extinction: How the Endangered Species Act’s Inci-
dental Take Permits Fail to Account for Population Loss, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10628, 10629 (2011).
110. Id.
111. Endangered Species Permits: Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs) and Inciden-
tal Take Permits, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/midwest/endan
gered/permits/hcp/index.html [https://perma.cc/U8YH-3QRF] (last updated Aug. 29,
2018).
112. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (2012); Endangered Species Permits: Habitat
Conservation Plans (HCPs) and Incidental Take Permits, supra note 111.
113. Donald L. Soderberg & Paul E. Larsen, Triggering Section 7: Federal Land
Sales and “Incidental Take” Permits, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 169, 179 (1991)
(citing U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., DRAFT CONSERVATION PLANNING GUIDELINES,
REGION 1 (June 19, 1989)).
114. Duggan, supra note 109, at 10628.
115. Fisher, supra note 11, at 375.
116. Id. at 386.
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the landowner completes an HCP, obtains an incidental take permit,
and complies with the HCP, any development that the private land-
owner pursues may continue with “minimal interruption, even if an
unlisted species covered by the plan is later listed as endangered or
threatened.”117 Therefore, the No Surprises policy is unique in that it
provides private landowners protections for both known and poten-
tially unknown species so long as the species are addressed in the
HCP.
Each of these programs have provided landowners with much-
needed flexibility under the ESA, but they are not doing enough to
ease the burden of ESA regulations on private landowners. The
agreements under the CCP are arguably the most flexible; however,
they are not available to private landowners who have listed species
on their land. These are programs that are employed in an attempt to
avoid listing a species altogether, not help a species recover from the
brink of extinction. Additionally, these programs only provide piece-
meal protection for a candidate species; there is no guarantee that the
candidate species will receive protection throughout its entire habitat.
Therefore, even if the landowner fully complies with these programs,
it is still very likely that the FWS will eventually need to list the
species.
Furthermore, there is debate about whether incidental take permits
and the No Surprises policy are adequate to protect endangered spe-
cies. For example, the incidental take permit may only take one threat
into account, usually man-made threats, and fail to take natural
threats to the species into account as well.118 Thus, when a natural
threat to the species is combined with the now-legal taking authorized
by the incidental take permit, the species is again at risk even though
the ESA technically still protects the species.119 Similarly, the No Sur-
prises policy places “enormous pressure on the limited resources of
the FWS” to meet statutory time limits and ensure that the scientific
data supports the decision to issue the HCP that will be in effect over
a lengthy period of time, discourages landowners from taking the
proper precautions at the beginning so that they can save money and
time by applying for an HCP later, and does not provide certainty for
private landowners regarding “any unaddressed species that are listed
as endangered or threatened subsequent to implementation of the
HCP.”120 Additionally, the incidental take permit application process
is a significant burden on landowners—especially small landowners—
as they must obtain an incidental take permit for any activity on their
land that will affect a protected species and will likely have to hire
117. Id.
118. See Duggan, supra note 109.
119. Id.
120. Fisher, supra note 11, at 404–05.
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environmental consultants and incur other major expenses to create
the HCP for the application.
Therefore, these programs are either too limited or too difficult to
implement in a way that ensures certainty for private landowners and
the protection of endangered, threatened, or candidate species. As a
result, the FWS should consider a more comprehensive approach to
providing flexibility for private landowners that will ensure the recov-
ery of species through an interconnected habitat.
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT
Environmental governance is rapidly experiencing a shift away
from the “traditional command-style legal regulatory model” because,
even though this model may be effective at regulating large industries,
it does not fully address many of the environmental issues facing the
world.121 As policymakers and regulatory agencies have studied alter-
natives to this top-down model, one of “the most plausible and in-
creasingly prevalent alternatives to emerge embraces a more
collaborative, multiparty and multilevel approach to environmental
and natural resources governance.”122 This collaborative-management
model promises to solve problems associated with the “traditional
command-style legal regulatory model” by providing a system that is
less “adversarial, expensive, unwieldy, and insensitive to local
contexts.”123
Collaborative management goes by many names,124 but they all
share several unifying themes such as “a focus on the virtues of collab-
oration, participation, contextual and ‘bottom-up’ governance, learn-
ing and adaptation, flexibility, and ‘new’ forms of accountability.” At
its core, collaborative management is a shift away from top-down gov-
ernance where a “single public manager engaged in a linear series of
contractual and partnership arrangements” makes decisions to a
broader approach where all participants “co-labor” together using a
“new structure, shared resources, defined relationships, and
communication.”125
121. Cameron Holley, Removing the Thorn from New Governance’s Side: Examin-
ing the Emergence of Collaboration in Practice and the Roles for Law, Nested Institu-
tions, and Trust, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10656, 10656 (2010).
122. Id. at 10657.
123. Id. at 10656–57.
124. The concept of collaborative management has also been described as “mul-
tilevel governance, collaborative governance, experimentalism, collaborative ecosys-
tem governance, the new regional paradigm, modular regulation, empowered
participatory governance, civic environmentalism, and reflexive environmental law.”
Id. at 10657–58 (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and
the Incomplete Legal Framework for Public and Stakeholder Voice, 2009 J. DISP.
RESOL. 269, 278–79 (2009).
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This type of management is extraordinarily flexible and can be
molded to fit various situations on a case-by-case basis. For example,
collaborative management can occur “within and across organiza-
tions,” such as how federal agencies often coordinate with each other
regarding environmental conflict resolution.126 It can also occur be-
tween “both homogenous and diverse partners,” such as how environ-
mental groups may collaborate amongst themselves or “work with
putative private sector polluters; conflicting local, regional, state, and
federal government agencies; and concerned citizens groups.”127 Fur-
thermore, professional facilitators are not necessarily required, with
the decision regarding whether to include them depending upon
whether the issue is contentious or not. For instance, it is likely that a
professional facilitator would be required when parties are trying to
come to an agreement regarding a highly polluted site involving many
different stakeholders such as “local, regional, state, and federal gov-
ernment; Native American tribes; nonprofit organizations; envi-
ronmental advocacy groups; and groups of local residents.”128
Alternatively, “[i]n lower conflict settings, regional voluntary service
coordination and collaboration may emerge voluntarily among local
governments,” such as when one county collaborates with another to
determine the best way to deliver services to residents.129 Finally, col-
laborative management can occur with or without public participa-
tion,130 although a system with public participation is the preferred
method of implementation because it ensures the consideration of as
many stakeholder opinions as possible.
Laws may either facilitate or constrain the implementation of col-
laborative management.131 For example, statutes can lower barriers to
collaboration “by authorizing public agencies to do anything together
that they have power to do apart.”132 Alternatively, laws may inhibit
collaboration by making legislation too restrictive, thereby making ef-
fective cooperation between different stakeholders impossible. Ulti-
mately scholars have suggested that there are “eight key design
principles for effective and enduring collaborative institutions”: (1)
clear boundary rules; (2) current local rules that ensure costs are pro-
portional to the benefits of collaboration; (3) active member participa-
tion in making and modifying rules regarding collaboration; (4)
members select their own monitors who are held accountable to the
group; (5) graduated sanctions; (6) participants have “‘access to rapid,
low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflict among users or between users
and officials”; (7) the government—whether national, state, or local—
126. Id. at 279.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 280.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 281.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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recognizes the right to organization; and (8) “[g]overnance activities
are nestled in multiple layers of an enterprise.”133
Furthermore, collaborative management can help parties avoid
problems created by litigation. Even though there are other methods
of mediation, litigation is often one of the only solutions for parties
when issues arise. However, litigation is extraordinarily expensive and
can become a huge burden, especially for private citizens. There are
social costs associated with litigation as well, as litigation “tends to
breed conflict and division within the communities affected by the
outcomes of the decisions.”134 As a result, litigation puts parties in
“unyielding, extreme positions [which] result in a ‘rigid rulemaking
and implementation process,’” often “restrict[ing] the free-flow of in-
formation essential to providing a viable solution to underlying land
management conflicts.”135 Thus, litigation is detrimental to both par-
ties and is often a catalyst for conflict instead of a method for resolv-
ing it.
However, collaborative management can help parties avoid the
problems associated with litigation. In fact, studies have shown that a
system of collaborative management “might decrease the number of
administrative appeals and lawsuits, . . . or in Washington talk, create
more ‘pre-decisional dialogue’ than ‘post-decisional’ challenge.”136
This is one of the major benefits of collaborative management—even
though it is possible for conflict to develop after an agreement is
reached, it is much more likely that any potential conflicts will be re-
solved at the beginning of the process, rather than at the end. In the
context of the ESA, this pre-decisional dialogue is not only good for
the parties involved but is also good for protected species. Litigation is
a lengthy process and species can suffer while parties are involved in
determining how to best protect the species at issue. Therefore, avoid-
ing the litigation process is not only good for agencies and private
citizens, but may be the best solution for protecting species as well.
There are ways in which the federal government has already begun
using collaborative management as a mechanism for environmental
conservation. In 1998, Congress began requiring the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice to establish “a multiparty monitoring and evaluation process” re-
garding stewardship contracts.137 Pursuant to this authority, the U.S.
Forest Service “may enter into stewardship contracting projects with
133. Lisa Blomgren Amsler, Collaborative Governance: Integrating Management,
Politics, and Law, 76 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 700, 703–04 (2016).
134. Matthew Schuckman, Note, Making the Hard Choices: A Collaborative Gov-
ernance Model of the Biodiversity Context, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 343, 360 (2001).
135. Id. at 357–58.
136. Martin Nie, Governing the Tongass: National Forest Conflict and Political De-
cision Making, 36 ENVTL. L. 385, 472 (2006).
137. 16 U.S.C.A. § 6591c(h)(1) (West Supp. 2018); Martin Nie & Peter Metcalf,
National Forest Management: The Contested Use of Collaboration and Litigation, 46
ENVTL. L. REP. 10208, 10210 (2016).
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private persons or other public or private entities to perform services
to achieve land management goals for the national forests and the
public lands that meet local and rural community needs.”138 This cre-
ates a system where the U.S. Forest Service can enlist the help of pri-
vate citizens in managing forest area, saving the U.S. Forest Service
costs and allowing for more involvement from private citizens. Addi-
tionally, Congress has confirmed their support for systems that use
collaborative management. In 2009, Congress passed the Collabora-
tive Forest Landscape Restoration Act which “funds landscape-level
forest restoration projects that are screened and recommended by a
federal advisory committee.”139
Additionally, not only have these programs been implemented, but
they have received support from within the government agencies run-
ning the programs. In 2016, the Chief of the Collaborative Workshop
within the U.S. Forest Service expressed his support for these pro-
grams, stating:
[Collaborative] conversations are incredibly important, because our
future depends on them. To achieve ‘the greatest good of the great-
est number in the long run,’ we need strong connections to our local
communities so we can work collaboratively to restore our land-
scapes, build public trust, and forge lasting partnerships to take us
into the future.140
Therefore, even though it is still too early to tell how effective these
collaborative programs have been, the reasons the Chief cited for the
importance of collaboration make the case for implementing these
programs—strong connections with local communities, the building of
public trust, and the laying of foundations for partnerships that will
ensure effective environmental conservation in the future.
V. COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT AS A METHOD OF ENFORCING
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Although collaborative management is a newer model of regulatory
enforcement, collaborative management is uniquely suited to address
environmental issues because of its ability to work in various situa-
tions, especially situations where there is no single right answer that
will solve the issues that Congress created the law to address.141 In
these types of cases where there is no “silver policy bullet,” “a portfo-
lio of policy strategies and instruments working on many different
138. 16 U.S.C.A. § 6591c(b).
139. Nie, supra note 136.
140. Tom Tidwell, Moving Forward with Collaborative Restoration, U.S. FOREST
SERV. (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.fs.fed.us/speeches/moving-forward-collaborative-
restoration [https://perma.cc/29JK-YPEA].
141. Carly P. Wolfrom, Navigating Climate Change Policy: The Opportunities of
Federalism, 27 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 162, 170 (2012).
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fronts and at different scales is needed.”142 With so many factors to
consider to ensure the recovery of protected species, collaborative
management is suited to work through issues that arise between agen-
cies such as the FWS and other entities, such as private landowners. In
the end, the issue is no longer whether agencies and private landown-
ers should collaborate, but how agencies and private landowners can
most effectively collaborate to create plans to protect endangered or
threatened species.
Collaborative management has the capacity to (1) allow parties to
solve complex problems created by the ESA by “harnessing the
unique information, resources, and capacities of diverse public and
private actors”; (2) fostering creative and adaptive approaches to the
planning and implementation of the ESA by “bringing together agen-
cies and stakeholders who are close to the problem”; (3) “reduc[ing]
existing conflict, enhance[ing] ownership, and thus increas[ing] coop-
eration in implementation by contributing to the formation of some
form of consensus among parties”; and (4) “enhance[ing] democracy
by allowing citizens and other nongovernment actors to interact, de-
liberate and work together cooperatively, build social capital, and pro-
mote civil behavior.”143 Therefore, it is time for the FWS to consider
implementing collaborative strategies as it enforces ESA regulations.
There are two things that are necessary for collaborative manage-
ment to work as a way to enforce ESA regulations: (1) case-by-case
implementation; and (2) a strong, neutral entity that has the capacity
to manage stakeholder interests.
First, for collaborative management to be most effective, collabora-
tive programs should be implemented on a case-by-case basis. One
model of collaborative management does not have the capacity to ad-
dress every situation for which a collaborative program can apply be-
cause the ESA protects a variety of species, and its regulations affect a
variety of landscapes, private landowners, and communities. This
means that there must be a process in place in which the FWS looks at
the specific case so that it can tailor a collaborative program to the
specific situation. Clearly, it would be impossible for the FWS to ex-
amine every situation in which a regulation could possibly affect a pri-
vate landowner because this would take too much time, money, and
personnel. Therefore, the first step of the process should be a way in
which a private landowner can contact the FWS to ask for their partic-
ipation in a collaborative process. This could be something similar to
how citizens petition agencies to begin an agency action or how a pri-
vate landowner or other entity can submit an HCP for an incidental
take permit. In this way, the FWS does not have to hunt down private
landowners to see if they want to participate in collaboration, saving
142. Id.
143. Holley, supra note 121, at 10659.
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time and resources for the FWS. Additionally, this allows the FWS to
tailor the collaborative process to the individual petitioner, ensuring
that the collaborative-management model is the best one for the situa-
tion. Finally, this ensures that the those participating in the collabora-
tive-management program are fully invested in the project.
However, some landowners may be reluctant to voluntarily partici-
pate in the collaborative process due to suspicions concerning govern-
ment interference. But implementing a program like the CCAA that
offers incentives for private landowner participation after a species is
listed could solve this problem. Generally, private landowners are
aware if they have or have the potential to have a listed species on
their land. These private landowners can either take steps to eliminate
the species from their property, ensuring that the species never comes
on their property, or cooperate with the FWS’s regulations regarding
protected species. If the FWS were to implement a program like the
CCAA for protected species, not just candidate species, then private
landowners would likely be more willing to work with the FWS in
creating a plan to protect the endangered or threatened species that
will also allow them to use their land more than if they were under
traditional ESA regulations. Additionally, the incentives associated
with a program modeled after the CCAA would give private landown-
ers more regulatory certainty regarding the protected species cur-
rently on their land and establish a strong, working relationship with
the FWS for situations in which additional protected species are
found.
Second, there must be a strong, preferably neutral, entity to manage
the collaborative process and organize the stakeholders involved. For
collaborative management to work effectively, there must be a quality
and balance of representation from every stakeholder. Additionally,
there must be a balance between conservation principles and the pri-
orities and needs of the people living in the area. However, because
collaborative management involves considering the input of varying
stakeholders, there is the potential for powerful groups to influence
the collaborative process for their own benefit. For example, the FWS
has vast resources and federal power at its disposal, so there is a risk
that it could influence the process in such a way as to manipulate the
collaborative process to the detriment of private landowners. Simi-
larly, large companies or influential landowners may also dispropor-
tionately influence the collaborative process through their economic
and political clout. Therefore, there must be something in place to
ensure that stakeholder interests are balanced in such a way to ensure
true collaboration.
The FWS is arguably strong enough to manage the implementation
of collaborative management, but it lacks funding and has its own in-
terests at stake. Therefore, it would be best to have some other entity
manage the collaboration. The selection of these moderators could be
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somewhat modeled after how arbitrators are selected during the arbi-
tration process. For example, in the agreement between the FWS and
a private landowner, the agreement could require that the FWS and
any other involved agency choose a moderator, the private landowner
chooses an additional moderator, and then those two moderators
choose a third moderator to help with the process. In this way, neither
party should have an undue influence on the proceedings because the
moderators can balance each stakeholder’s interests.
Once these two things—case-by-case implementation and a strong,
neutral entity to manage collaborative projects—are in place, the ex-
perimental populations clause can provide an avenue for the FWS to
begin implementing collaborative management.
The experimental populations clause is probably the best way for
the FWS to begin implementing collaborative management. The ex-
perimental populations clause is a portion of Section 10 of the ESA
that “offers an avenue to authorize activities that would otherwise be
prohibited.”144 Pursuant to this authority, the FWS can reintroduce
“populations established outside the species’ current range, but within
its historical range, as ‘experimental’” populations.145 Additionally, if
the species is determined to be nonessential—meaning that the exper-
imental population would not be essential for the continued existence
of the species—the FWS may test new ideas that would normally vio-
late the ESA because there is no risk of destroying the species.146 This
gives the FWS flexibility to try out new strategies, like collaborative
management. Therefore, the FWS could use this clause as an avenue
to implement collaborative-management agreements with private
landowners and see what processes work best in different environ-
ments. The only downside to using this clause is that it is a long pro-
cess, probably requiring a concerted effort over decades. However,
despite the lengthy process, this is arguably the best way for the FWS
to begin collaboratively working with private landowners with little
risk of violating the ESA or the regulations already in place.
Additionally, the FWS can use collaborative management as a type
of “half-way” house for recovering species, like the gray wolf. Just
because a species has recovered per FWS standards does not mean
that the species will not end up back on the endangered species list. In
fact, legislation in Idaho has the potential to possibly reduce the gray
wolf population to a level where the species could end up listed as
endangered or threatened again. Therefore, the FWS could use col-
laborative management to ensure that private landowners and species
144. Endangered Species Act: Experimental Populations, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., https://www.fws.gov/verobeach/FloridaPantherRIT/20150819%2010j%20Ex
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interact in such a way that, once a species is removed from the endan-
gered or threatened species list, the species does not get listed again.
Like environmental groups who are already working with ranchers to
develop alternative ways to deal with wolves interfering with live-
stock, the FWS could work with private landowners through agree-
ments to develop ways that would allow private landowners to use
their land while ensuring that the species stays off the endangered spe-
cies list for good.
VI. CONCLUSION
Without the ESA, the United States would probably have lost hun-
dreds of species—if not more—over the past few decades. Therefore,
the ESA is necessary to protect the nation’s biodiversity. However,
just because something is good, does not mean it cannot become bet-
ter. The ESA’s stringent standards are important to ensuring the pro-
tection and recovery of species; however, they disproportionately
affect private landowners. The FWS can implement the ESA in a way
that works for private landowners and species by moving away from a
top-down regulatory model that agencies have traditionally used, to a
more collaborative model that takes the interests of various stake-
holders into account. By implementing collaborative management
through programs such as the experimental populations clause or even
by creating a half-way house for recovering species, the FWS can
more effectively protect species while simultaneously incentivizing
private landowners and allowing them to have more control over their
land.
